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CASE NOTE: FRAUD NEGLIGENT MISREPRE-
SENTATION AND INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL
DISTRESS AFTER 20 YEARS OF VOID MAR-
RIAGE
VANCE v. VANCE, - Md. , 408 A.2d 728
(1979)
by Mark D. Woodard
On December 12, 1979, the Maryland Court of
Appeals affirmed the opinion of the Court of Special
Appeals that Muriel Vance was entitled to recover money
damages from her husband of eighteen years, Dr. Arnold
Vance, for negligent misrepresentation.
Arnold and Muriel participated in a religious marriage
ceremony in Arlington, Virginia on September 29, 1956.
They lived together as husband and wife for eighteen
years, and had two children. On February 1, 1974,
Arnold left Muriel. Muriel sought and received a decree in
the Circuit Court for Howard County awarding her ali-
mony and child support. Arnold successfully filed a mo-
tion to strike the decree and annul their marriage as he
had not been divorced form his first wife at the time of his
marriage to Muriel.
As a result, Muriel was precluded from any share of the
couple's property or alimony. She was left without judi-
cial remedy to require her purported husband to support
her, thus suffering both emotional and legal trauma.
In response, Muriel filed suit against Arnold for the
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and the negli-
gent misrepresentation by Arnold of his marital status,
praying for damages on both counts.
At trial, the evidence indicated that Arnold separated
from his first wife in July, 1954, and initiated suit for an
absolute divorce. He erroneously believed that he
obtained his final divorce decree on September 12, 1956.
About one month after his September 29, 1956, mar-
riage to Muriel, Arnold discovered that his divorce decree
had not become final until October 16, 1956, but he
never told Muriel of this fact at any time prior to the 1974
annulment motion.
Muriel's mother testified that Muriel was in a state of
emotional collapse after Arnold filed to annul their mar-
riage. Muriel testified to the emotional distress she had
suffered as a consequence of a twenty year deception.
Further mental anguish, Muriel testified, was caused by
her belief that her two teenage children were now illegiti-
mate.
Walter Hess, Muriel's son from a previous marriage,
testified as to her emotional condition following the
discovery that her marriage to Arnold was void. Hess was
worried by her emotional depression and the change in
her appearance from "a woman of beauty to a person
who looked 'a wreck', with unkept hair, sunken cheeks,
and dark eyes." He also testified that he had great diffi-
culty in communicating with his mother since she
"seemed unaware of her own presence and spent long
periods crying and sobbing," and he feared she would
end up in an asylum. However, Muriel did not present
any medical evidence to substantiate her claim for dam-
ages based on her physical condition.
At the conclusion of all the evidence, Arnold was
granted a directed verdict on the intentional infliction of
emotional distress count. The jury returned a verdict for
Muriel of $50,000 for the negligent misrepresentation,
but the trial judge entered judgment N.O.V. for Arnold on
this second count.
Muriel appealed both rulings to the Court of Special
Appeals. In a decision reported at 41 Md. App. 130, 396
A. 2d. 296 (1979), the court reversed both judgments of
the trial court. It reasoned that Muriel's nervousness,
spontaneous crying, hollowed appearance, and inability
to relate to the present, all constituted evidence of an
external condition manifesting a physical injury. The
court rejected the belief there can be no injury to the
mind without an overt showing of bodily harm, and con-
cluded: "the psyche is as susceptible of injury as the
body, and absence of apparent physical damage does not
serve to lessen the extent of the mental injury." Id. at
137, 396 A. 2d at 301. They held that there was legally
sufficient evidence to establish all elements of the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The court explained that the traditional rule allowing
recovery for emotional distress required a "physical im-
pact" to the plaintiff concurrent with the incident produc-
ing emotional distress. There was no recovery allowed for
emotional distress alone, for physical injury resulting from
emotional distress, or for the negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress under any other circumstances.
Maryland rejected the "physical impact" rule in Green
v.. Shoemaker, 111 Md. 69, 73 A. 688 (1909), and per-
mitted recovery for negligent infliction of mental distress,
if a physical injury results. The court noted the traditional
rationale that mental distress can be easily simulated and
that no clear standard exists for measuring such suffering,
and concluded that a cause of action exists only when the
mental distress results in a physical injury. See also, Tea
Company v. Roch, 160 Md. 189, 153 A. 22 (1931).
The Maryland standard for recovery for the negligent
infliction of emotional distress was established in Bow-
man v. Williams, 164 Md. 397, 165 A. 182 (1933). In this
case, the plaintiff was frightened for his own safety and
that of his childen when he observed a truck, out of
control, coming toward his house. After the truck crashed
through the foundation of the house, the shock to his
nervous system resulted in emotional distress which kept
him under medical supervision for two weeks and pre-
vented him from working for six months.
The Bowman court affirmed a jury award of damages
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for mental distress, noting that medical and other evi-
dence indicated that the plaintiff had suffered a nervous
disorder as a result of the accident. The court observed:
"The nervous shock of fright sustained by the plain-
tiff was based on reasonable grounds for apprehen-
sion of an injury to the plaintiff and his children, and
was one which naturally produced physical de-
terioration as distinguished from those shocks which
primarily work on the moral nature, to the exclusion
of actual physical injury." Id. at 402, 165 A. at 184.
The Bowman court reaffirmed the Green rationale that
suits seeking recovery for injuries resulting from fear,
fright, or other emotional distress should be allowed not-
withstanding the possibility of simulated, feigned or spe-
culative claims.
The court concluded:
"A plaintiff can sustain an action for damages for
nervous shock or injury caused without physical im-
pact, by fright arising directly from defendant's negli-
gent act or omission, resulting in some clearly appar-
ent and substantial physical injury as manifested by
an external condition or by symptoms clearly indica-
tive of a resultant pathological, physiological, or
mental state." Id. at 404, 165 A. at 184.
For cases applying the Bowman "physical injury" stand-
ard, see Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923
(1951) and H&R Block v. Testerman, 275 Md. 36, 338
A.2d 48 (1975).
In Vance, the Court of Special Appeals indicated that
the requisite "physical injury" resulting from emotional
distress may be proved in various ways; through evidence
of an external condition, by symptoms of a physiological
state, or through evidence indicative of a mental state.
The word "physical" means the injury is capable of ob-
jective determination.
The Court of Special Appeals held that Muriel"...
established symptoms of a mental state evidencing a
physical injury within the meaning of the Bowman stand-
ard." The court noted that the realization that her twenty
year marriage was void had a "devastating" effect on
Muriel. In addition to experiencing symptoms of an ulcer,
Muriel reflected her emotional collapse in her "signif-
icantly deteriorated physical appearance-unkept hair,
sunken cheeks, and dark eyes". The court concluded that
Muriel suffered an objectively manifested nervous dis-
order that was the forseeable result of Arnold's negligent
misrepresentation concerning his marital status. Id. at
137, 396 A.2d at 301.
On appeal Arnold contended that Muriel had pre-
sented no medical evidence to support her claim for
emotional distress. The Court of Appeals found that while
expert medical testimony may be advisable it was not a
prerequisite to recovery. Maryland courts have permitted
persons to testify about their physical injuries and mental
distress without supporting medical testimony. Wilhelm v.
State Traffic Comm., 230 Md. 91, 185 A.2d 715 (1962).
However, in a situation involving complex medical ques-
tions and in cases involving a significant time lapse be-
tween the purported injury and the negligent act, expert
medical testimony is required.
The Court of Appeals agreed with Muriel that there
was legally sufficient evidence to establish the separate
tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The elements necessary to prove intentional infliction
of emotional distress are:
"1) The conduct must be intentional or reckless;
2) The conduct must be extreme and outrageous;
3) There must be a causal connection between the
wrongful conduct and the emotional distress; and
4) The emotional distress must be severe."
Harris v. Jones, 281 Md. 560, 380 A.2d 611 (1977).
The court found that "Arnold's negligent misrep-
resentation regarding his marital status in 1956 and sub-
sequent concealment of that fact for almost twenty years,
could not, of itself, have caused Muriel to suffer emotional
distress because she had no knowledge of it .... In 1956,
when Arnold told Muriel he was free to marry her, he
could not have anticipated that under circumstances ex-
isting some twenty years later, he would reveal what he
previously concealed and cause Muriel to suffer severe
emotional distress." Id. 408 A.2d at 737.
CONCLUSION
The equities of the case were on the side of Muriel.
While this was not expressly articulated in the court's
opinion, it was at least an important, if not decisive,
consideration. Muriel was saddled with a double burden
of emotional distress after Arnold left her. On top of the
ordinary pain of ending a marriage, Muriel found her
"marriage" a legal nullity from which she had no legal
right of recovery for alimony or property after eighteen
years of living in reliance on that "marriage". The discov-
ery of Arnold's misrepresentation did lead to a greatly
increased emotional burden and would seem to argue for
the justice of the Court of Appeals result.
It is important to note that the doctrine of interspousal
tort immunity was not addressed in this suit. However,
sub silencio, this suit of a husband by a wife, under
admittedly unique circumstances, is an instance of a
breach of interspousal immunity. (See the accompanying
article "Wife v. Husband in Maryland after Vance v.
Vance").
